A new weapon designed to hit one of the most vulnerable points of the West: the cables laid on the seabed through which the internet, communications and a fundamental part of the data used by satellite systems pass. Russia reportedly tested the technology in secret this spring in Arctic waters, but the operation was discovered and interrupted by three NATO countries.
To reveal it is Reuterswhich cites two Western officials briefed on the operation. The United Kingdom, Norway and the United States reportedly spotted and followed some Russian units into waters near the Svalbard Islands, eventually forcing them to abandon the exercise.
The Russian weapon for hitting cables without leaving traces
At the center of the operation would be the Gugi, the main Russian directorate for deep-sea research, one of the most secretive structures of Moscow’s military apparatus and specialized in operations on the ocean floor. According to sources heard from Reutersthe Gugi would have used deep-sea submarines to simulate the deployment of sophisticated technology capable of damaging underwater infrastructure. Western officials have not explained how the system works, due to the sensitivity of the information.
It does not appear that any cables were actually damaged. It would have been a simulation of what Russia could do in the event of a conflict with NATO. When Western units detected the operation, the Russian ships were followed and confronted at sea until they stopped the activity and left the area.
London and Oslo had already announced last April that they had discovered it Clandestine Russian activities in the Arctic. Until now, however, neither the precise location of the operation, nor American participation, nor above all the existence of the new technology had emerged.
Why Svalbard is so important
The area chosen for the exercise is not random. Svalbard is connected to mainland Norway via two fiber optic cables approximately 1,400 kilometers long, which in some places are 2,700 meters deep. Huge quantities of information collected by the SvalSat satellite station, the largest satellite ground station in the world and part of the network also used by NASA, also travel through these lines.
In a war scenario, decommissioning infrastructures of this type could therefore interrupt not only internet connections and financial transactions, but also communications and data flows of military and strategic importance.
Then there is another geographical element. Between Svalbard and Norway lies the so-called Bear Gap, one of the corridors through which Russian nuclear submarines based on the Kola Peninsula must pass to reach the Atlantic. It is one of the most delicate areas in the military confrontation between Russia and NATO in the Far North.
NATO’s fear: Moscow could test Article 5
It is above all the context in which the operation took place that worries Western services. Three American officials cited by Reuters they argue that within US intelligence there is a growing fear that Moscow could, sooner or later, put Article 5 of NATO to the test, i.e. the principle according to which an attack against a member state is considered an attack against the entire Alliance.
Sabotage of underwater infrastructure could be one of the tools used in such a scenario: serious enough to cause enormous damage, but potentially ambiguous enough to make it difficult to immediately assign responsibility and decide whether to trigger the collective response.
Norwegian Defense Minister Tore Sandvik explained that the joint operation wanted to send a clear message to Moscow: Russian clandestine activities can be detected and an attack on critical infrastructure would have consequences. At the same time, Oslo stressed that no one has an interest in further increasing tension in the Arctic.
Moscow, for its part, has long denied conducting sabotage operations in NATO countries or preparing a clash with the Alliance. The Russian Defense Ministry did not respond to Reuters’ questions about the Svalbard case.
The invisible war on the European seabed
The safety of submarine cables has become a NATO priority after the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines in 2022 and after a long series of accidents involving electricity and telecommunications cables in the Baltic.
According to data from maritime analytics firm Windward cited by Reutersbetween October 2023 and the end of 2025 at least 11 undersea cables were damaged or severed in the Baltic Sea. Furthermore, in the North Sea alone, in 2025 over 13 thousand ships were identified engaged in so-called drifting, i.e. slow navigation on or near sensitive infrastructure, with an increase of 52 percent in one year. The activity itself is not illegal, but security experts say it can be used to map cables and pipelines for future operations.
This is also why NATO has strengthened patrolling of European seas with initiatives such as Baltic Sentry and the British Nordic Warden system. In short, the new game between Russia and the West is not only being played with missiles, drones and tanks. An increasingly important part of the confrontation passes several thousand meters below the surface of the sea, along thin cables on which a growing share of the European economy and security depends.